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CAROLYN MARVIN 
13 Peaceable Kingdoms and 
New Information Technologies 
Prospects for the Nation-State 
How WILL global commm1ications tedrnologies transform the 
nation-state? Could they threate11 its existence as the linchpin of the inter-
national system? Those 1,vho·ponder new technologies gathering steam in 
the early twenty-first century and the ponderously creaky social formation 
called the nation-state disagree about the likely outcome of the collision 
between them. Some prophets have imagined an end to two centuries of 
nation~state tribalism and armed conflict. Otl\er visions sketch pm,verful 
nation-states hemorrhaging sovereignty from onslaughts by predatory su-
percapitalism. Dramatic fantasies of doom and salvation have always ac-
companied shifts in communications technology. They are less informative 
about the likely character of the future than about important strains in the 
social structure of societies experiencing technological change. 1 
Social distance changes when technological innovation raises or lowers 
customary communicative barrkrs, Writing, telegxaphy, and telephony all 
have transformed social distance in this fashion. Today we arev,ritness to the 
restless and continuing reorganization of local, intermedial'e, and global so-
cial distances by the Internet, cell phones, instant messaging, tape cassettes, 
compact disks, digital imagery, and more on the way. It would be surpris-
ing if major shifts Jn how humans con1municate vvith one another had no 
important implications for social structure. At the level of lived existence, 
social structure is visibly anchored by conventions of proper social distance 
in face-to-face exchanges between persons of similar or different statuses. 
Related conventions govern mediated interaction. Such rules govern pub-
lic and private boundaries and generate proced01es for establishing tmst 
1n role encounters, The most visible shifts in communication technology re-
arrange familiar social distances and imperil this carefully calibrated social 
trust. Because they are both unsettling and excitin~ such rearrangements 
are a prominent theme of popular culture, which faithfully registers popu-
lar desires and fears that emerge from them. 
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It would be hard to conclude from inspecting contemporary popular 
culture that the fate of nations as nations hangs in the balance of new com-
munications technologies from the perspective of most citizens, however. 
According to popular discourse, new communications technologies affect 
morality, and not for the better. Likewise affected are civility and various 
kinds of authority, including parental authority, many forms of professional 
authority, and the private authority citizens have over information about 
their own lives. But the stability of the nation-state seems secure in popular 
imagination. (This is a different matter than the fate of particular nation-
states, which always hangs in the balance.) Popular assessments do not 
guarantee that drastic political consequences do not lie ahead. They do 
mean that popular identification with nation-state belonging is an espe-
cially stable feature of modern social and personal identity. 
Communicatively speaking, nation-states descend from eighteenth-
century newspapers, nineteenth-century telegraphy, and twentieth-century 
broadcasting. Measured against the history of other significant communi-
cations technologies, digital technologies thus seem destined for large po-
litical consequences, popular assessments notwithstanding. Discussion on 
this point is necessarily speculative, and humility is definitely in order for 
any effort to discern through a glass darkly the long-term consequences 
of technological change. Still, with no thought that nation-state forms are 
eternal or inevitable, it is far from obvious that the nation-state will be a 
front-line casualty of new forms of global communications. Nation-states 
are likely to weather the transformations of digital technology for a long 
time to come. 
How shifts in communications set in motion transforming cultural shifts 
has always preoccupied theorists of the grand sweep, for whom print offers 
the prototype example. One of the best known, Elizabeth Eisenstein, argues 
that the cultural episode we call the Renaissance flowed directly from the 
diffusion of printing. 2 She also gives print a propelling role in two powerful 
ideologies of Western modernity, early modern science and Protestantism. 
For Harold Innis, the transformative power of printing is a function of the 
dramatic expansion it made possible in cultural memory, and in its expo-
nential enlargement of the transmission and distribution of information. 
Computing likewise vastly amplifies cultural memory (the dimension In-
nis calls "time-binding")3 and transmission and distribution in real time 
(which Innis calls "space-binding"). For Innis, communication technologies 
that bind both space and time in new ways, as printing did and computing 
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now does, foster geographically large, politically centralized forms of em-
pire. The United States is this kind of empire. 
Benedict Anderson ties his grand argument about print to felt solidar-
ity more than to increases in mechanical capacity. He argues that the emer-
gence of nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the di-
rect outcome of the diffusion through print of nationalist senti1nent. Shared 
written vernaculars linked colonial bureaucratic elites in "imagined com-
munities" that nourished new-nation sensibilities. Anderson sees modern 
nations as communities of strangers imagining one another as comrades 
through shared texts that provide the affective bonds of nationhood. 4 If, in 
fact, community boundaries are as malleable as printed imaginings of them 
are fluid and abundant, global communities are possible because global 
texts may be distributed with little effort. But there is a gap in Anderson's 
formulation between the moral sentiments people have and the claim that 
these convictions arise automatically from the existence of an appropriate 
vehicle along which they may travel. 
Nation-states are not simply well-coordinated daydreams of language 
and information. They are communities of moral obligation whose mem-
bers' bodies are committed to mutual common defense. Such commitments 
include sacrifices willingly undertaken by citizens and acquiescence to the 
state's willingness to compel citizen sacrifice through conscription and 
other means. "Where popular readiness for sacrifice is lacking, visible state 
compulsion will imperil national unity and purpose. The Vietnam War pro-
vides the living memory example for the United States. Mere diffusion of 
information and propaganda proved unable to persuade a large enough 
majority of citizens that North Vietnam posed a threat to American national 
security. Where lives and not only words are at stake, more than mere tex-
tual imagination of new political forms is needed to create or sustain the 
affective glue of enduring group cohesion. By the same logic, there is a 
missing piece in most assessments of the role digital technologies will have 
in the larger political transformations we might expect them to facilitate. 
WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO COLLECTIVE IDENTITY? 
To resolve this issue we must consider the nation as the locus of collective 
identity for its citizens. Among all the overlapping communities of iden< 
tity to which modern persons belong, why does the rhetoric of sweeping; 
technological change focus especially on nations? Eric Hobsbawm puts the1  
puzzle this way: ·· 
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[the nation-state] is, in Benedict Anderson's useful phrase, an "imag-
ed community/' and no doubt this can be made to fill the emotional void 
left by the retreat or disintegration, or the unavailability of real human 
communities and networks, but the question still remains why, having 
lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type 
of replacement. 5 
we could say why nation-states constitute the core group of belonging in 
odernity, as Liah Greenfeld and other theorists of nationalism insist they 
, we might better understand the cohesive dynamics of contemporary 
mm unities and better predict the likely rearrangements of time and space 
hat digital technologies will encourage. 6 
Hobsbawm has no doubt that there exists a real human community, even 
' humans have somehow contrived to lose it. How this could happen is 
ot a trivial question, but I take Hobsbawm to be asserting a foundational 
ttmode for human society. He perhaps implies that "reaY' communities are 
{\ organized around face-to-face interaction, which makes possible the au-
~, thentic connections upon which "real" communities depend. At the very 
;: least, more bodies cannot be made without such interaction! 7 I believe the 
same applies to collective action for solving the most difficult tasks of sur-
vival, and propose that what makes nations the key source of political iden-
tity for modern people is that national communities are the most potent 
bloodletters, the most visible users of bodies in the contemporary world. To 
paraphrase Weber's description of the state, sovereignty at its most basic is 
having legitimate killing authority. 8 Citizenship is a relation of submission 
to such killing authority. 
Without bodies, society is impossible, to be more concrete about it. The 
more removed from immediate bodily presence the community of belong-
ing is from those who must be persuaded to belong to it, the more dramatic 
must be the means of overcoming the gap that mediated forms open up 
between belonging as a moral relationship and intimacy as an experien-
tial condition. Where members have personal experience of all other mem-
bers in small-scale societies, there is no gap between belonging and inti-
macy. Where connections are attenuated by distance and mediated through 
texts-in the sprawling industrialized nations where readers of this essay 
are likely to live-ties of compelling psychological and social power must 
be generated in the absence of physically intimate bonds that unite mem-
bers of face-to-face communities. 
How to bind the loyalties of the foot soldiers who must be enlisted 
to project nation-state power abroad and ensure domestic tranquility at 
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home-and the loyalties of the families that offer them? It is no accident 
that Clausewitzian total war was invented and theorized contemporane-
ously with the rise of the nation-state. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was 
a Prussian officer and veteran of German and Russian campaigns against 
both the French Revolutionary Army and Napoleon in the regimental sys-
tem that antedates modern nation-state military organization. Regimental 
armies were invented by absolutist rulers seeking an end to the structural 
instabilities of feudalism. In that system rulers were required to reward 
noble princes with land for fighting men and services rendered. Through 
strategic alliances and the acquisition of ever more territory, ambitious feu-
dal lords might contrive to topple the rulers they served only to become 
vulnerable themselves in an endless, exhausting cycle of bloodshed and 
conquest.9 
Regiments, or standing armies, changed this. Skills in the strategic com-
mand of men at war were transferred from an aristocratic class of princes to 
a bureaucratized officer corps forbidden to acquire territorial holdings. In 
exchange for fighting services, men at arms were housed and maintained 
permanently at the ready by the sovereign power. By this means a ruler with 
a body of dedicated landless fighting men at his disposal no longer faced 
the nobility as a rival military power. 10 The nobility was brought into court, 
a waning decorative testament to a dying social system. Standing armies re-
quired two innovations. Royal taxation of a merchant bourgeoisie anxious 
to have peace for the sake of commercial enterprise solved the economic 
problem of sustaining permanent armed bodies of landless men. And cul-· 
tivation among the citizenry of a willingness to make any sacrifice at all in 
the service of the nation, an ethic of total war, provided both justification 
and engine for social and psychological unity. 
Clausewitzian theories of war were conceived within the assumptions 
of emerging centralized states. Lawful bearers of arms bound.to surrender 
their lives to authority on demand were distinguished from irregular sol-
diers outside disciplined authority. Our image of total war is masses of men 
standing in rows, slaughtering and being slaughtered, perhaps for hours at 
a time. Such wars of attrition became the blood sacrifice rituals of nation-
states partly because they aroused emotions of religious intensity and force. 
The ritual lesson of total war is that Durkheimian sentiments of solidarity 
manifest as nationalism can be generated where-but more to the point,, 
only if-blood sacrifice is great enough to trump competing ties of kinship, 
ethnicity, class, and religion that threaten it. Large numbers of casualties 
unify the community by equalizing the sacrifices of citizens. A large sacri0 ' 
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fi.ce guarantees that blood, the most magical of bodily substances, sooner or 
touches everyone in the group. Soldiers are touched directly. All who 
are connected to them by kinship or close affiliation are indirectly touched. 
The greater the number of soldiers sacrificed (short of a sacrifice too great 
for the group to sustain itself, which possibility is used to wring ever greater 
dedication from t~ose who are called), the more demanding and personal 
is the shared ordeal of every member of the community in sending them, 
and the larger the community that may be thus unified. Where men have 
lost what Hobsbawm calls a "real" community, only conditions this severe 
can generate a shared bond equivalent in moral strength to those long as-
sociated with face-to-face social intimacy. 
Compared to one knit together by blood rituals, can such solidarity 
be generated in the famously imagined Andersonian textual community? 
Events experienced in one's own skin provide the deepest forms of emo-
tional life available to humans. Textual experience is derivative by defi-
nition.11 Though Anderson never systematically considers the content of 
national texts, these contribute to solidarity largely by cementing bodily 
sacrifice to nationalism. The specific examples of national texts Anderson 
puts forward are of exactly this kind, though he fails to notice that the cru-
cial mechanism of connection is sacrifice rather than print, which provides 
a necessary means of distribution but not the engine of motivation. And 
though shared texts disseminate and amplify knowledge of sacrificial bod-
ies, texts simply as texts cannot create the compelling feelings of responsi-
bility we call patriotic obligation and guilt. In rituals of national solidarity, 
texts play a supporting liturgical role. There is no substitute for real blood 
shed by striving and suffering bodies in producing the conviction of shared 
national kinship. 
The limiting size of political communities, therefore, is not only how 
much physical territory can be coordinated and integrated through systems 
of transportation and communication, nor even the number of people that 
can be kept in line by force. The size of political communities is limited by 
the size of a population for which it is possible to enlist men's deepest moral 
sympathies through body-to-body ties. The farther-reaching the links of move-
ment and message, the more citizens are bound to be physical and moral 
strangers to one another. The more citizens are strangers, the more dramatic 
and compelling-the more violent-must be the rituals that elicit their will-
ingness to sacrifice despite (and frequently in defiance of) family, religion, 
and other body-based affiliations that compete for moral supremacy and 
have the capacity to derail or destroy national purpose. Texts play a critical 
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role in recalling past national sacrifice. But without real bodies to back them, 
as gold backs currency, and without periodically renewed ritual offerings 
of those bodies that constitute the real treasure of the community, enduring 
groups can neither maintain themselves or address serious threats to their 
existence. 
All this sounds strangely primitive in an era when textual authority is 
plainly powerful. In the modern West, it might be said that all bodies are 
disciplined with respect to literacy. Some are disciplined in its use, others 
are disciplined to keep away from it. Social distinctions based in literate 
practice separate those who use and expend their bodies in physical work 
from those with relative discretion to preserve and protect their physical 
bodies from labor and hardship. Those with access to literate currencies 
learn to conceal their bodies in the production and manipulation of literate 
signs through costly strategems of self-control. It is the privilege of the pre-
served body to remain concealed within and protected by the practices and 
products of literacy. Compared to the less socially esteemed body, which 
remains relatively more visible and unprotected, suppression of the body 
is the condition of literate achievement.12 
Those whose cultural power depends on controlling the production and 
reception of texts make up the textual classes. Those who depend on the la-
bor of their bodies, who cannot conceal themselves behind texts, comprise 
the bodily classes. In Western history the agonistic play of texts against bod-
ies was propelled decisively forward by the Reformation, a deep and sus-
tained attack on traditional body-based forms of ritual magic in the name 
of textual authority. 13 For the performative magic of bodies, manifest in the 
transmutation of bread and wine, curing the sick, and even baptism, the 
sixteenth-century Reformation substituted an equally magical commitment 
to textual authority and practice, manifest as correct scriptural belief. Now 
focused on the system of secular constitutional law, reverence for literate 
authority still undergirds the system for conferring and distributing social 
resources and prestige in modern industrialized societies. 14 
Textual communities do not engage in blood fighting. They leave this 
task to the body classes. In textual communities, intellectuals are front men. 
Stereotypically not in control of their own bodies, ridiculed as asexual, pow-
erless to command other bodies, intellectuals legitimize textuality to the 
bodily classes. Existing at the sufferance of more powerful (textual) elites 
than they, they are charged to idealize textual sensibilities as noble, ethe-
real, and morally exalted. The body class learns its subordinate social place 
from these textual class missionaries. Through rituals of cultural deference, 
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body class members are schooled not to notice that the true power of the 
textual class consists of controlling and disposing of the bodies of nontex-
tual classes. 
Electronically mediated communications are simply the most contem-
porary form of textualized messages. Like texts that have preceded them, 
digital texts are abstracted from the bodies that produce and receive them. 
Like these texts, they are endlessly duplicated and effortlessly distributed. 
Even digital prophets who expect nation-states to recede as residues of a 
primitive past, replaced by text-based digital communities, are historically 
familiar. The vision of a universal textual language that links metropolitan 
cultures while effacing traditional rural populations recalls Enlightenment 
elites who offered this dream to liberal cosmopolites of eighteenth-century 
Europe. Internationalism, observes Tom Nairn, has always been the ideol-
ogy of rnetropole intelligentsia, not rural peasantry or the countryside. 15 
Literate elites benefit first and disproportionately from new textual tech-
nologies. They reinforce their elite positions by absorbing and dominating 
these technologies. They imagine the extension and triumph of their tech-
nology over all others. They have a stake in ignoring the sacrifice of nonelite 
bodies to support their dominant position. In industrialized countries, this 
sacrifice is exacted especially from police and soldiers whose bodies guar-
antee the safety of textual elites through forcible expulsion of illegal im-
migrants, and from the poor who lack textual skills for amassing cultural 
capital in the struggle for status. These dispossessed fight back with their 
bodies-and mostly lose. 
VISIONS OF THE GOOD STATE 
In fairness, the vision of a universal culture is not limited to the textual class. 
If societies may be broadly classed as dominated by textual or bodily elites, 
there are instances enough of the latter. With the instructive exception of 
Nazism, bodily elites have not been dominant in the ~odern West. In re-
cent history, Khmer Rouge nationalists forced urban-educated elites into 
the countryside to labor for Pol Pot's body-dominated ruling cadres. The 
Taliban of Afghanistan visited draconian spectacles of punishment on those 
who failed to comply with the strict bodily observances mandated by their 
own brand of Islam. Mao's Great Leap forward was launched in the name 
of a utopia of the body and the political subordination of the textual classes. 
The brutality of bodily regimes is more visible than that of textual regimes, 
their injustices more easily recognized and denounced from outside. Falling 
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behind in a society dominated by textual elites has a more hidden profile 
since less literate and nonliterate groups lack means and skill to call effective 
outside attention to the economic and physical violence visited on them. 
The chains of social and economic dependence are also longer in textual-
ized regimes than in regimes of the body. Elaborated, textually mediated 
connections between power-holders and those at the mercy of power are 
not only less visible, the less participants know one another, but arguably 
more difficult to intervene in as well. 
Those who foresee a decline in nation-state sovereignty do not argue 
that nation-states are too big or too small or otherwise unable to provide 
physical protection and sustenance to their citizens. After 200 years it is 
clear that the administrative and political form of the nation-state offers a 
stable foundation for productive societies. Prophets of nationalism's demise 
claim that digital teclmologies portend a centrifugal denationalizing power 
of irresistible force. This is a surprising claim if we consider that other 
distance- and time-annihilating communications technologies-telegraphy, 
radio, and television-have expanded rather than contracted the power of 
nation-states. 
Prophets of denationalization like Jean-Marie Guehenno and Francis 
Fukuyama argue that the digital "despatialization" of the world spells the 
"end of politics" and the nation-state as the most prominent of political 
structures. 16 Just as Daniel Bell once proclaimed that information age tech-
nologies portended the "end of ideology," Francis Fukuyama has claimed 
that history, conventionally understood as dramas of nation-state strife, is at 
an end. 17 His version of technological transformation proposes a Hegelian 
progression from nationalism to liberal democracy, a view also advanced by 
early twentieth-century thinkers such as Durkheim in France and Dewey in 
the United States. 18 A less sanguine stages-of-history argument is offered by 
theorists who take to heart Marx's admonition that the existence of nation-
states has lo~g permitted capitalists to divert workers from their true class 
interests. These critics hope for the end of what Fukuyama labels the thymic 
aspects of nationalism-chauvinism, ethnocentrism, racism, fascism, and 
militarism. Thus Jolm Lukacs observes that the struggle of the twentieth 
century was not a struggle of classes but nations. 
What could replace the tottering nation-state? Benjamin Barber, Wilson 
Dizard, and Walter B. Wriston predict that increasing economic interdepen-
dence across political borders will prevail over political interests that fuel 
armed conflict. 19 The European Union (EU) offers a hopeful model for pro-
ponents of this view. It is also an ambiguous one since its success rests on 
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the political stability of its nation-state members. A successful EU would 
not resemble a new political form so much as a superstate of those now 
comprising it. Still, Samuel Huntington has warned that commercial con-
tacts are a dubious thread on which to hang hopes for peace. 20 No nations 
were more economically interdependent than Germany and France in Au-
gust 1914, or the Germans and the Soviets in June 1941. 21 Commerce is as 
likely to inform people about their differences as their commonalities. One 
of the lessons of the antebellum U.S. Post Office was that mail from North-
ern abolitionists inflamed Southern resentment toward the North wherever 
it circulated. Increased communication may as easily sharpen conflict as 
promote harmony. 
The debate over America Online' s policy of removing individual sub-
scribers and messages that "harass, threaten, embarrass, or do anything 
else to another member that is unwarranted" offers a quick snapshot of the 
issues that surround digitally communicated conflict. The issue here is in-
structive because it represents no great challenge to nation-state peace and 
security. It simply offers a window on the quotidian comings and goings 
of social exchange in the cyberage. 22 By excluding the rude, America On-
line hopes to minimize conflict and provide an atmosphere of civility for 
millions of subscribers. The unmourned victim of this policy is open demo-
cratic communication in which conflict is no less likely than harmony to 
manifest itself. If America Online' s goal is not democratic access for the rude 
and civil alike, but eliminating uncivil disagreement, powerful compulsory 
restraints must be applied. These will always serve the most entrenched no-
tions of the status quo. The tactics of pacification never eliminate force. They 
simply disguise it. America Online itself exists only so long as a nation-state 
able to exercise force is willing to defend it. All nation-states, even the most 
democratic, are supported by violence, even when they have learned to hide 
it behind layers of distracting text. 
Invent the printing press, Thomas Carlyle is supposed to have said in an 
early version of the optimism that drives utopian prophets of globalization, 
and democracy is inevitable. Apparently not. The printing press has been 
as useful to entrenched totalitarian states as to model democracies. If elec-
tronic communications were inherently democratizing, we could depend 
on "technologies of freedom" simply to wear down the hierarchies that frus-
trate democracy. 23 But technological form provides no democratic guaran-
tees. Global communications systems often require expressly undemocratic 
centralizing infrastructures in order to stay up and running. If global elec-
tronic communications could further democracy, would this be a gain for 
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world peace? James Lee Ray asserts that liberal democracies have never 
attacked one another by force of arms. 24 He also acknowledges that democ-
racies have not been reluctant to initiate war against nondemocracies or to 
colonize vulnerable peoples. Having divested themselves of colonial em-
pires in the twentieth century, the most powerful among them project force 
geopolitically through client states caught in webs of dependence that con-
stantly threaten escalating conflicts. 25 The notion that citizens linked by new 
forms of communication will have no motivation to fuel the passions of na-
tionalism simply disregards the history of nation-state violence by democ-
racies and nondemocracies alike. 
I hasten to acknowledge that the arguments put forward here apply 
to textual, or explicitly re-presentational, technologies. Were forms of vir-
tual interaction to become genuinely indistinguishable from face-to-face 
encounters, all bets are off. I am prepared to believe that body re-forming 
technologies might present genuine alternatives to the body-based moral 
communities of nation-states. In fanciful visions from teleportation to hu-
man cloning, they constitute the limiting case for the present analysis. 
THE POLITICS OF THE BODY 
However secure their political form for the near term, nation-states do 
face significant challenges in an era of globalized computing. The percep-
tion that bodies are increasingly detached from "real" human communities 
offers a vantage point from which groups whose livelihoods are directly 
threatened, and whose cultural and social authority is greatly reduced by 
digital technologies will interpret their situation and consider their options. 
They include workers who provide personal services (e.g., travel agents, 
financial consultants, real-estate brokers, messengers, traveling salesmen, 
private-practice physicians) that can be offered more efficiently and exten-
sively by new technologies, or whose consumers can be cream-skimmed 
by electronically based providers. They include educators, librarians, and 
other petty bourgeois members of the textual class whose professional au-
thority is eroded by networked databases and automated retrieval systems. 
They include body class workers in domestic manufacf:uring whose living 
standards have declined along with these industries. They include those 
who lack basic literacy skills, and are able to command only the most me-
nial of jobs in the digital economy. 
Those who experience the erosion of bodily authority as a loss of social 
power experience it as the destruction of morality, civility, authority, 
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autonomy. At home and abroad, such groups may be expected to resort 
to rituals of restoring the purified body to power. In the United States a 
presidential impeachment focused around the sexually scandalous (and 
lying, finger-pointing) body was consistent with such anxiety. So are moral 
panics about sex and violence; health issues such as smoking and irra-
diated food; and perceived assaults on the family such as gay marriage, 
abortion, and priestly pedophilia. The politics of the body is registered in 
increased resistance to immigration and other expressions of tribal resis-
tance to impure bodies. It predicts ever greater hostility from those who, 
lacking textual skills, find themselves on the wrong side of the global and 
national economy. Nor should we be surprised to see enhanced punish-
ments (more prisons incarcerating more bodies and lesser crimes punished 
with penalties that display the stigmatized body to the community) for 
bodily crimes from murder to prostitution. We can expect the rhetoric of 
alarm eventually to embrace computing itself as a threat to the nation-state 
(the Taliban, for example, forbade computing on the grounds that monitors 
could receive forbidden images). Such expressions already haunt the po-
litical discourse of marginalized body-class groups who fear conspiracies 
by international textual elites such as the United Nations and the Trilateral 
Commission. 
That the modern technologically integrated state will strike with special 
vengeance against body-based challenges is also clear. Terrorism is the ob-
vious case. Consider also domestic hate crimes, which increase penalties for 
violent assaults motivated by prejudice against bodies that are symbolically 
privileged in the current political climate-minorities, women, gays. Such 
penalties demonstrate to members of the body class, the primary perpetra-
tors of bias crimes, that angry efforts at retribution for the raw deal they per-
ceive themselves to have from a society that disdains the bodies they offer 
will be dealt with more severely than text-based injustices. Red-lining, em-
ployment discrimination, and corporate consolidation are deeds on paper 
that eliminate jobs, pensions, and health care. For those without recourse to 
the textual machinery of expensive litigation or relatively protected textual-
class employment, these deprivations result in lost life opportunities. Tex-
tual class crimes may be less visibly brutal than hate crimes but are no less 
determinative of the life courses of their victims, and the number of their 
victims is significantly greater. Thus do the social sorting mechanisms of a 
textual society deflect and devalue the body class and keep it under control, 
not least by keeping its members divided against themselves. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nation-states are the form that human tribes take in a technological world. 
Though digital technology may support and re-present blood sacrifice to 
citizens as print and broadcasting have done before it, the existence of 
nation-states requires forms of blood commitment by citizens for which, 
finally, there is no substitute. Texts give central authorities far-reaching 
power to monitor bodies at a distance. Such coordination has been among 
the chief contributions of computing technology to nation-state power. But 
if texts, including digital texts, provide the means, they cannot provide the 
distinctive glue of group loyalty. To replace the nation-state with alternative 
moral communities will require new rituals of sacrifice and fertility able to 
compete with nation-state war in emotional scale and power. Such rituals 
are not impossible to imagine; they could well make total wars of attrition 
look limited and civilized. They should give us great pause. If nation-states 
turn out not to be adequate suppliers of sacrificial ritual demand, what 
new levels of ferocity and brutality might be necessary to command the · 
dedicated loyalties of more extended communities of strangers? 
Not that brutality has ever been partial to particular political forms. 
Lynching, clan warfare, domestic violence, and slavery are all robust genres 
in the familiar record of man's inhumanity, and none requires nation-states 
for their expression. They remind us that enduring communities at every 
level organize violence, like sex, to promote their own survival. The col-
lective tension that surrounds violence does not arise, in the first instance, 
from its destructiveness to individuals, but from the knowledge that ener-
gies so powerful can destroy the very communities they are deployed to 
sustain. This powerful combination of creativity and destruction is part of 
violence's religiously compelling aura. Whatever new computing technolo-
gies offer in the way of challenges and opportunities for the nation-state 
will be faithfully manifest in the fortunes and misfortt1nes,. advances and 
retreats, rewards and punishments of the interface between bodily violence 
and increased textual coordination and control. To chart the most disruptive 
consequences of the digital revolution, follow the bodies. 
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